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Abstract: This study examines the effectiveness of a closed circuit
television (CCTV) system installed in Burnley, Lancashire in northwest
England. It considers both the outcomes and mechanisms through
which they were brought about. Three areas are identified: "focal"
beats, within which the CCTV cameras were installed; "displacement"
beats, which were continuous to the focal beats; and "other" beats,
comprising the remainder in the police division. With regard to both
overall recorded crime and separate types of offences, the research
finds significant decreases in the focal area, no spatial displacement,
and some diffusion of benefit to the displacement area. There was some
dilution of impact over time. There was no evidence that the proportional
effect of CCTV changes by time of day, according to periods when sur-
veillance with cameras would be more or less difficult. Crime fell more
steeply as the first cameras were installed, with diminishing increases
in effect as more were put in place. These patterns suggest that the im-
pact of cameras is not simply a result of surveillance effects per se.
Other preventive mechanisms were also triggered.
THE NATIONAL CONTEXT
CCTV is one of the fastest growing sectors of the security industry,
estimated by the end of the century to account for close to 30% of all
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security system sales (Cully, 1996). The popularity of the method is
very great, although the wisdom of many of the purchasing decisions
may be called into question (Hearnden, 1996). The U.K. Home Office
has actively promoted the use of CCTV for the surveillance of public
areas, and expenditure on the tool has recently run at the astonish-
ing level of three-quarters of total Home Office expenditure on crime
prevention (Koch, 1997). Competitions for CCTV funding have sur-
vived the change of government, albeit with an apparently increased
emphasis on mobile systems.
There is, at first sight, impressive evidence that CCTV may reduce
crime. This has been brought together by Home (1996), and his
summary table is modified and presented below as Table 1. Whilst
the figures are at first sight impressive, three points must be made.
First, the comparisons tend to be of a simple before-after design, and
there is emerging evidence — in Glasgow, Scotland at least — that
such comparison obscures more complex trends. Second, the
evaluations vary in their competence. Third, they are not helpful in
suggesting how CCTV achieves its effects.
Short and Ditton (1995, 1996) are particularly critical of the stan-
dard of CCTV evaluation. The points they make include the following:
• The evaluations have often not been carried out by independent
researchers.
• The before and after periods are not long enough, or else are not
seasonally matched.
• Crimes are aggregated, masking contrary trends in different
crime types
• Appropriate comparison areas are seldom used as a baseline.
• The nature of the attendant publicity is never mentioned.
• Percentage falls, rather than absolute numbers, are often re-
ported.
• Displacement is rarely mentioned.
The second issue concerns why CCTV has the effect it does. Paw-
son and Tilley (1997) offer a number of possibilities, which the pres-
ent writer has extended into the following list:
• "Caught in the act" — perpetrators will be detected, and possibly
removed or deterred.
• " You've been framed" — CCTV deters potential offenders who per-
ceive an elevated risk of apprehension.
• "Nosy porker" — CCTV may lead more people to feel able to fre-
quent the surveilled places. This will increase the extent of natu-
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ral surveillance by newcomers, which may deter potential offend-
ers.
• "Effective deployment" — CCTV directs security personnel to am-
biguous situations, which may head off their translation into
crime.
• "Publicity" — CCTV could symbolise efforts to take crime seri-
ously, and the perception of those efforts may both energise law-
abiding citizens and/or deter others.
• "Time for crime" — CCTV may be perceived as reducing the time
available to commit crime, preventing those crimes that require
extended time and effort.
• "Memory jogging" — the presence of CCTV may induce people to
take elementary security precautions, such as locking their car,
by jogging their memory.
• "Anticipated shaming" — the presence of CCTV may induce people
to take elementary security precautions, for fear that they will be
shamed by being shown on CCTV.
• "Appeal to the cautious" — cautious people migrate to the areas
with CCTV to shop, leave their cars, and so on. Their caution and
security-mindedness reduce the risk.
• "Reporting changes" — people report (and/or police record) fewer
of the crimes that occur, either because they wish to show the
effects of CCTV or out of a belief that "the Council is doing its
best" and nothing should be done to discourage it.
Is it academic self-indulgence to be concerned with the mecha-
nism whereby something worked? Shouldn't one just be pleased that
it apparently did? In fact, it is crucial to know the mechanism. Only
knowing it will enable the reproduction of success in new schemes,
the maintenance of success in existing schemes, and the cost-
efficiency of CCTV operation generally.
In short, CCTV has a central place in current crime control tech-
nology; such evaluation as has been done suggests substantial ef-
fects. However, there is good reason for remaining cautious about the
nature and extent of these effects, and, most important, for exploring
more thoroughly why CCTV worked.
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Table 1: The Success of CCTV?
Burnley CCTV Evaluation — 229
THE BURNLEY CONTEXT
All CCTV cameras installed to date in Burnley were placed in the
three town centre beats, Tl, T2 and T3. The present report will deal
with matters other than the movement of crime within the beats cov-
ered by Burnley's CCTV. This point is of importance, since it looks at
the very detailed relationship between camera coverage and crime,
with its implications for camera siting and offender awareness, and
the reason for its delay should be clarified. Such a study is under
way.
While gross estimates of effect can be reached with a division of
crime locations simply into beats, the more subtle effects require geo-
coding of the data very precisely. The Lancashire Police Service is
currently moving towards routine geocoding of its crime data. That, of
course, means that geocoding of the data other than in the very re-
cent past did not happen. Even after retrospective geocoding was un-
dertaken, upwards of one-third of even recent crime reports did not
have a precise location attached. This can be improved by reference
to text data but the process will be a hard manual grind. But it is
worth going through this process. Otherwise, the data are vulnerable
to the charge that non-geocoded events are somehow different from
geocoded events, which makes any conclusions about the distribu-
tion of crime within the beats covered by CCTV unreliable.
This report concerns itself exclusively with recorded crime
changes, comparing CCTV-covered and other areas. Also reported are
time-trend data, examining changes of particular crime types along-
side the number of cameras installed up to that point. The speed with
which changes in different crime types occurred is also examined, as
are the implications of those. An extended discussion section makes
recommendations based on the data or upon problems and issues
that are beginning to emerge in other areas of the country with which
the writers are familiar.
We categorised areas of the Burnley police command into: beats
with cameras (focal), beats having a common boundary with beats
containing cameras (displacement), and other beats in the police divi-
sion (other). The first group comprises beats in which crime should
decline, insofar as CCTV has an effect. The second comprises areas
into which crime would arguably be displaced from the beats covered
by cameras. The last group operates as the baseline. Spatial dis-
placement should not occur to these areas given that there are closer
and equally promising areas to which CCTV may displace crime.
What follows are percentage changes in crime in the first two
categories relative to the third, comparing each year with 1994 fig-
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ures. Thus in Table 2 below are included all crimes. Also in the table
is the number of crimes occurring in 1994 in the areas concerned, to
get an idea of the relative scale of the areas' crime experience. To il-
lustrate, total crime in 1996 was 28% lower in the focal areas than it
had been in 1994. In the same year, total crime was 3% lower in dis-
placement areas, and 9% higher in other areas. Figures for 1997 are
grossed from crime occurring in the first eight months of the year,
and are thus imprecise.
Table 2: Total Crime Changes Relative to 1994
(Pre-CCTV)
Table 2 demonstrates that the areas in which cameras were in-
stalled showed a reduction of one-quarter in the crimes they suffered
in 1996 and 1997 relative to 1994. The effect has held up quite well
over time, suggesting that it was not solely the result of transient
factors like additional publicity. Of great interest is the fact that the
adjoining areas showed trends similar to those of the non-adjoining
areas. This means that there is no evidence of displacement of crime
to adjoining areas. In fact, in all three years, the change that oc-
curred in displacement areas was intermediate in extent between
those taking place in focal and other areas. If displacement had oc-
curred, the displacement areas should have shown increases greater
than those of other areas, since they would be experiencing their own
crime increase plus crime displaced from the focal areas. If anything,
the pattern shows diffusion of benefits rather than displacement. The.
concept of diffusion of benefits is crucial and will be briefly discussed.
When a crime prevention programme is put in place, the argument
usually advanced by those sceptical of its worth is that crime is dis-
placed to Other areas. Research has suggested that displacement is
seldom if ever total, so that there is virtually always a net benefit in
crime reduction. Even more interestingly, research sometimes shows
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the opposite of displacement, namely, diffusion of benefits (see Hes-
seling, 1994). Diffusion of benefits occurs when the areas surround-
ing an area with a crime prevention programme also show a decline
in crime. Intuitively, this makes sense, insofar as an offender does
not think in terms of police beats or other administrative units, and
will not be sure where a scheme's boundaries lie. Most volume crimes
take place close to an offender's home base, and there is a limit be-
yond which most offenders do not typically travel to crime. The pat-
tern of the Burnley data suggests a diffusion of benefits. Owing to
CCTV, some crimes will become known to the police that would oth-
erwise not have been recorded, so the observed reductions are almost
certainly understatements of real reductions.
Having shown the change in crime generally, what does analysis
of individual crime types show? Obviously, some crimes are so rare
that analysis would not be meaningful. However, what is the picture
for common crimes? Table 3 looks at all assaultive crimes combined
(including robbery, attempted robbery and theft from the person). It
will be seen that the reduction in the focal and displacement areas is
greater for crimes of violence than for total crime, in both focal and
displacement areas. The increase in other areas represents relatively
few crimes. As in Table 2, the pattern is more consistent with diffu-
sion of benefits than with displacement.
Table 3: Crimes of Violence: Changes
Relative to 1994 (Pre-CCTV)
Turning to drug crime, the pattern is rather different, as Table 4
shows. All drug crimes are combined in Table 4, from cultivation
(there are few opium poppy fields in Burnley town centre) and supply
through possession and allowing premises to be used for drugs. Most
of the crimes are simple possession. Drug crimes fell in the focal
area. Although both displacement and other areas show increases,
once again the displacement area shows less of a rise than other ar-
eas. The sharp increase in recorded drug crimes outside the CCTV
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area suggests a general trend that the focal area, by one means or
another, was able to buck. Drug markets are particularly visual, and
it may be that CCTV has been involved in the disruption of town
centre drug markets. However, since the bulk of drug offences involve
simple possession, this could not possibly be more than a contribu-
tory factor. More likely is a CCTV effect that is more complex than
simple surveillance. This point will be returned to a little later.
Another crime that will take place in large measure in public areas
is theft of and from motor vehicles. Table 5 reveals the trends in-
volved. Offences combined here are theft of and from motor vehicles,
aggravated taking of motor vehicles, and interfering with a vehicle.
The familiar pattern recurs. Vehicle crime declines greatly in the
target area, and the surrounding areas show trends that are inter-
mediate between the focal areas and outlying areas, consistent with
diffusion of benefits rather than displacement.
The next step is to look at burglaries, both domestic and other.
The two are combined in Table 6. Roughly the same pattern is evi-
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dent, with changes in displacement areas intermediate between CCTV
and other areas.
As for criminal damage, shown in Table 7, there is a more modest
decline in CCTV areas, and the displacement/diffusion-of-benefits
story is unclear. Criminal damage is a poorly reported crime, so
changes are especially difficult to interpret here.
The next step is to look at a crime type on which CCTV should not
have a direct, surveillance-based effect. Demonstrating a reduction
for crimes not susceptible to visual scrutiny of public places would
not suggest that the decline was spurious, just that its mechanism is
a little more complex, within or beyond the mechanisms listed earlier.
Table.8 combines fraud and handling of stolen goods, to generate
numbers sufficiently large for analysis. These are crimes to which
CCTV surveillance should not be directly relevant.
Although these crimes were aggregated so as to yield enough
cases to make trend analysis feasible, there were still too few in out-
lying areas for comfort, hence the proportionately huge increase in
these offences in 1997. The cell to which attention should be drawn is
the 1997 cell for focal areas. The decline in 1997 is greater than in
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1996. The only other table for which this was true concerned drug
crime. A more detailed analysis of trends is presented later in this
report.
Table 8: Fraud and Handling Stolen Goods: Changes
Relative to 1994 (Pre-CCTV)
Why do crimes not occurring in public and therefore not liable to
CCTV surveillance show a decline? In particular, why do they show a
decline that increases with time, rather than one that decreases, as
with other crimes? Three explanations come to mind. All of these are
testable by conducting more research, but are beyond the scope of
the work presented here.
(1) Criminals are versatile, and (with some exceptions) the most
active offenders are the most versatile (see, for example, Tar-
ling, 1993). By disrupting some types of offending, others are
prevented directly (by the imprisonment or other control of
perpetrators), or indirectly (by the generalisation of perpetra-
tors' sense of the risks involved in offending). By either
means, one would expect an increasing effect with time,
whereas for direct effects, one would expect a diminishing ef-
fect with time. In short, CCTV has its effect by disrupting the
general patterns of offending of versatile (and hence usually
prolific) offenders. If this is true, it is important, because it
would suggest that CCTV has its greatest effect on the people
on whom one would most want it to impact, namely, versatile
and prolific offenders. This could be tested by looking at de-
tected crimes in the Burnley CCTV area. If this speculation is
correct, then CCTV would coincide with a reduction in the
proportion of cleared crimes attributable to the most prolific
offenders. Thus, for example, if before CCTV the top 10% of
offenders accounted for 50% of cleared crime, and afterwards
the top 10% accounted for 25% of the cleared crime, that
would support the notion advanced.
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(2) CCTV either changes the way the police and local authority
work, by knowing and logging the whereabouts of prolific of-
fenders, or releases police time to deal with offences that take
place in private and that require proactive policing. Offences
like handling stolen goods, and drug possession, for example,
are cleared as they become known. Of these two sub-options,
the first is testable by interview with staff in the CCTV control
room, and scrutiny of the logs insofar as they deal with rec-
ognised individuals. The second (which is believed implausi-
ble) would be testable by examination of the manner of clear-
ance of a sample of cleared fraud cases in 1994 and 1997.
(3) By the memory jogging and reporting processes suggested by
Pawson and Tilley, people become more crime conscious in
private as well as public, so are more likely to become aware
of these kinds of crime, and to report them. This is testable by
examination of the number of crimes of these types cleared
primarily through the public's supply of information to the
police.
Time
The analysis of year-to-year trends, as presented in Tables 2
through 8, gives some partial insights into what happened in Burn-
ley. However, this should be supplemented by examination of what
happened over time, without breaking the time continuum into such
crude slices. This is true for the important reason that the cameras
were switched on at different times, so that the "active ingredient" —
CCTV surveillance — grew in irregular steps. When time is broken
down day by day, week by week or month by month in this way, the
number of events occurring in each period quickly becomes too small
to analyse. If the data are broken down into individual crime types,
the numbers become too small to analyse very quickly indeed. This
means either that the analysis must rely on aggregate crime, and/or
that some method of smoothing the data statistically has to occur.
For linking crime with camera deployment, the whole point of doing
the analysis is to identify trends over short periods of time, so the
second approach is unsatisfactory. Later, the trends of sub-
aggregates of total crime are smoothed for a different purpose,
namely the demonstration of which crime types decline quickly and
which decline slowly.
For all its difficulties, time has to be incorporated in the analysis.
Figure 1 presents monthly aggregate reported crimes for the CCTV
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area and the total for adjoining beats. The figure for January 1995
was set at 100 for both data sets, to enable easy comparison. Figure
1 confirms what we knew from the preceding analyses, namely, that
crime in the CCTV areas declined relative to surrounding areas. Since
we already have indications that there is some diffusion of benefits to
surrounding areas, Figure 1 somewhat understates the extent of the
reduction. While not designed as such, the figure is useful in depict-
ing the CCTV-associated gross reduction, an area covered in the ta-
bles appearing earlier in the paper. What Figure 1 is important for is
providing an indication of how CCTV worked.
Figure 1: Monthly Crime by CCTV
Presence
The decline seemed to begin in March 1995. The first CCTV cam-
era went up in April 1995. This is not so bizarre as it may appear. In
many cases, crime prevention measures work before they "should."
Publicity, consciousness, and enthusiasm may all communicate
themselves to people. What this trend suggests is that the CCTV
mechanism may have more to do with a social climate change than
changes in the processing of offenders, or changes in the perception
that offenders have of situations in which they are taking a risk. The
very simplest explanation may be that although the cameras were
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switched on in April, they may have had effects before that. It would
be nice to know the schedule of installation work.
A better indication of the process may be gained from Figure 2,
and from statistics associated with it. Figure 2 expresses the data of
Figure 1 in a different way, and alongside some different data. One
line in Figure 2 represents the proportionate reduction in crime in
CCTV areas relative to surrounding areas. For example, in May 1995
(month 5) crime in the CCTV areas, at 80%, was 20% lower than
crime in the surrounding areas, against a baseline of January 1995.
The second line in Figure 2 represents the number of CCTV cameras
installed by that month. To be precise, it represents the proportion of
the eventually installed cameras that had not been installed by that
month. For example, from July through September 1995, three-
quarters of the CCTV units had yet to be installed. The reason for
presenting the data in this apparently bizarre way is that the amount
of crime should decline as the number of cameras increases. It is
easier to see trends when the data series go in the same direction,
and since the two ways of expressing the relationship are identical,
the number of cameras installed was converted to the number of
cameras yet to be installed. Sceptical readers should simply trace one
of the lines and turn the tracing paper upside down.
The basic question here concerns whether the periods in which
cameras increased in number were also those in which the number of
crimes fell. It looks as though during the first installations, crime de-
clined apace. In fact, the relationship was quite a close one up to
September 1995. The large number of extra cameras installed during
autumn 1995 was not associated with further large decreases in
crime. The decline in crime continued until it bottomed out in mid-
1996. Of course, we cannot tell whether the continuing decline in late
1995 and early 1996 was linked with the installation of extra cam-
eras, or the working through of the effects of the first cameras. For
example, it is unclear which of these might have incapacitated of-
fenders detected through the deployment of the first cameras after
the time it took for bail, court appearance and sentence.
The installation of the last few cameras was linked to a very slight
increase in crime. Looking at the figures reinforces the view that the
effect of CCTV is not the simple effect of increased surveillability. This
is so because:
(1) The decline in crime began too early, i.e., it had started (per-
haps through publicity) in the months before any camera was
deployed.
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(2) There was no one-to-one relationship between the number of
cameras deployed and either the absolute or the proportion-
ate reduction in crime.
Oddly, this is good news. It may be that even quite a modest
scheme, if appropriately presented and executed, may have a swift
and disproportionately large effect upon rates of crime. However, it
would be good to establish whether the later crime reduction was the
immediate effect of extra cameras, or the delayed detec-
tion/incapacitation effect of the first cameras. A speculative attempt
will be made to take this analysis further.
Figure 2: Crime and CCTV Cameras
Crimes were aggregated into subtotals, for example, burglary, as-
saultive crime, sex crime and so on. Figure 3 shows those crimes that
declined swiftly when (or even before) CCTV was installed. These were
burglary, vehicle crime, and other property crime. The fact that these
are the swiftly declining crimes gives confidence that CCTV is impli-
cated in the declines, since they are among the crimes that may best
be overseen.
Figure 4 shows those crimes whose decline was somewhat later.
These are drug crime, fraud (including forgery and false accounting)
and criminal damage. Violent and sex offences are intermediate be-
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tween the crimes shown in Figure 3 and those shown in Figure 4. Sex
crimes are quite rare, and a trend based on such small numbers is
virtually meaningless.
What is different about the late-declining crimes? Fraud is a crime
that typically occurs in private. Most drug crimes involve simple pos-
session and are therefore not particularly conspicuous, so any effect
of CCTV is likely to be indirect. Indeed, drug possession is entirely
invisible unless one has a sackful of the stuff. Only when it is used is
it visible, and even then the action is ambiguous in its interpretation.
Figure 3: Crimes that Fell Quickly
with CCTV
The decline in criminal damage may have been slow for a different
reason; namely, that the cameras brought to attention damage that
would otherwise have remained unreported, so that the real decline
occurred earlier.
In short, all analysable crime types did decline. Two of the three
types that declined later are crimes that typically occur in private. It
is suggested, consistent with earlier data, that the CCTV effect is far
from simple, and examination of the details of the offence should be
undertaken to clarify this point.
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An additional observation is that fraud and drug crime are crimes
that are typically recorded at the point of detection. Unlike burglary
and violence, for example, where victims suffer crimes and may or
may not bring these to the attention of the police, fraud and drug
crimes are typically only recorded when a police officer or other citi-
zen identifies the offence as such. Those who possess drugs do not
have a decision to make whether to report the crime to the police (or
not a decision they would recognise as such). Thus the pattern ob-
served is one that would be consistent with a more proactive policing
style, perhaps made possible by the reduction in other types of town
centre crime.
Time trends may also be looked at to gain further information
about displacement. Correlations reflect the degree of association
between data sets, and may vary between +1 (which shows a perfect
positive correlation, as, for example, between height and hand span)
and -1 (which shows a perfect negative correlation, as, for example
between individuals' enthusiasm for Burnley and Blackburn Rovers
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soccer teams). Month-by-month correlations between rates of crime
in CCTV and adjacent areas can be used to show the association
between these variables.
The correlations between rates of individual crimes in CCTV and
adjoining areas were generally very low. They are presented as Table
9. None of these correlations is statistically significant. More impor-
tant, only one is negative. If displacement were an important issue,
these correlations should be negative, since the decline in CCTV areas
should be associated with a simultaneous or quickly following in-
crease in adjoining areas. For those interested in statistics, manipu-
lating the data by lagging (i.e., linking a decline in one area with the
change in the next month or the month after that) does not change
the conclusion, so the data do not suggest that this month's crime
prevented in the town centre moves to an adjacent area next month.
Table 9: Correlation between CCTV and Adjoining Areas:
Monthly Data by Crime Type
Time of Day
If CCTV works by direct surveillance, at what time of day should it
work best? One possibility is that it should work best at those times
when there is the least general bustle, because the signal/noise ratio
is most favourable, i.e., these are times at which there is less move-
ment other than that associated with the crime itself to distract the
CCTV operator. This assumes one kind of mechanism by which the
effect is achieved. Other mechanisms would imply different patterns.
What do the data suggest?
It is surprisingly difficult and time-consuming to establish this, for
two reasons. First, the meaning of morning and evening hours de-
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pends upon the season, and we do not have a whole year of pre-
CCTV-timed data to make the appropriate seasonal adjustments.
Second, crimes are not precisely timed, or precisely timeable, even by
their victims. Particularly for crimes like car theft and burglary,
much time may elapse before a crime is known to have occurred. In
an extreme case, burglaries occurring when one is on holiday may
have taken place at any time since one went away. These problems
invite the question of how one allocates crimes to times without in-
cluding meaningless time allocations but while retaining all the us-
able data for analysis.
This was done by selecting those crimes for which the first and
last possible times were either on the same day or on successive
days. Thus, a crime that could have occurred on February 2nd or 3rd
was retained for further consideration. This included 91% of all
crimes. However, allocating a time to a crime that may have taken
place at any point between a minute after midnight on one day and a
minute to midnight the next day is not especially helpful. For that
reason, a time window was selected that did not reduce the data to
meaninglessness. Then, those windows were selected that had a first
and last possible time within six hours of each other. This comprised
68% of the remaining crimes (i.e., .91 * .68 of all crimes). The no-
tional time was then set halfway between the first and last possible
time, so that a crime that took place between 1 a.m. and 5 a.m. was
timed at 3 a.m. The times were then classified into three-hour seg-
ments, as midnight but before 3 a.m. and so on. We thus ended up
with each crime in one of eight time segments, as shown in Figures 5
and 6. Perhaps the first thing to say is the obvious point of how une-
qually crime is distributed across 24 hours, with very little crime oc-
curring in the small hours. The writers' initial thought would be that
CCTV would have its greatest proportional effect when particularly
little was happening, because there would be few distractors at such
times.
To allow for comparison of seasonally equivalent periods, the first
three months of 1995, 1996 and 1997 were selected. These three-
month periods are referred to below and in the figures as epochs.
The number of crimes in each of the three epochs — early 1995,
early 1996 and early 1997 — is presented in Figure 5 for CCTV areas,
and in Figure 6 for adjoining areas. The time distribution of crime in
the adjoining areas remains fairly consistent. For CCTV areas, there
is a reduction in crime in each of the time segments, and it is roughly
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Figure 5: Changes in Crime by Time of
Day: CCTV Areas
Figure 6: Changes in Crime by Time of Day:
Adjacent Areas
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in proportion to the number of crimes at that time in the pre-CCTV
period. In other words, the suspicion does not hold that the effect is
greatest at times when there is little to distract the observer. Simi-
larly, the notion that the reduction is related to daylight does not
hold. This pattern seems to have less to do with the technicalities of
CCTV and more to do with a general, more complex and subtle
change in how people — including offenders — see CCTV operations.
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE DATA
(1) The area covered by CCTV showed crime reductions of 25% in
1996 and 16% in 1997 relative to statistically expected levels.
The real reductions are almost certainly greater than those
shown because of additional crimes that came to police notice
through CCTV.
(2) Effects occurred across crime types rather than being specific
to some crimes. There were declines even in the kinds of
crime that are not usually carried out in public view. Such
declines tended to come later than more visible crimes, sug-
gesting an indirect effect beyond simple surveillance. This ef-
fect was also suggested by the changing relationship between
the number of cameras deployed and the rates of crime. This
is an important point in that it may suggest an optimum
number of cameras per area to maximise effect at minimum
total cost.
(3) There was no evidence of spatial displacement. This conclu-
sion was reached by correlational analysis and by comparison
of CCTV areas with adjoining and other areas in Burnley.
There was some evidence of diffusion of benefits whereby ar-
eas adjoining CCTV coverage also received some advantage. If
any further research were undertaken locally it should per-
haps be an examination of the subsequent criminal careers of
those who are known to have committed crime in the CCTV
areas before coverage began.
(4) There was no suggestion that CCTV locates crime more pre-
cisely in time, nor that the proportional effect of CCTV is
greater at some times of the day or night than others. This is
intriguing, and again suggests effects that go beyond the
simple efficacy of surveillance.
(5) More sophisticated estimates of effects within target areas will
provide information with greater practical implications.
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(6) There are minor signs that crime is now beginning to increase
in CCTV areas. It is suggested that some publicity be given to
the final version of this report, complete with anecdotes of
detections achieved via CCTV use. If we are right about how
the effect is working, this may well induce a restoration of the
full reduction.
SPECULATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
There was a reduction in crime associated with the advent of
CCTV, and it seems not to have been displaced. Indeed, the benefits
of CCTV may have diffused to adjoining areas. Burnley has thus been
successful in its CCTV work. What remains to be done is to clarify the
means whereby the success was achieved and the ways available of
maximising effects, both locally and nationally.
The reduction achieved seems to be more than a simple surveil-
lance effect, and further research could clarify the mechanism fur-
ther. However, what already exists is enough to speculate that even
an unambitious scheme may have beneficial effects, and that extra
camera coverage may not produce proportional extra reductions in
crime.
Although what follows does not stem from the data analysis re-
ported above, we would like to make some observations about emer-
gent problems in CCTV usage elsewhere, and their relevance to the
Burnley situation. CCTV has clearly been a success. To consolidate
that success and to build upon it may be aided by an understanding
of the dynamics of operating a system.
Control Room Operator Training
Two as yet unpublished studies of CCTV have concentrated on the
performance of control room operators (see Norris and Armstrong,
this volume). Both of these have yielded results that are controver-
sial, and they will certainly stimulate debate. The criticism is that the
choice of what is observed may be frivolous (with attractive women
targeted), or may be stereotyped as to likely perpetrators (with young,
minority-group males being observed more often than their frequency
on the scene observed would justify). Obvious alternative responses
to such charges could be found in training, and the requirement of
awareness of the codes of practice that already exist. General princi-
ples that are not contentious can be enunciated to guide camera di-
rection. These include targeting places in which more movement is
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found, places with recent crime experience, and places with incon-
gruities like no light and single-person movement at night. In our
view, this should go along with an investigation of logs to determine
within-shift effects, e.g., fewer incidents observed per crime reported
in surveilled areas as shifts proceed. It seems astonishing to us that
the rich literature on radar operators' vigilance and efficiency, opti-
mal rest breaks and the like have not been brought to bear on CCTV
control room practice. These two issues — the ethics and the effi-
ciency of control practice — go together. Practice is optimised by
maximising the number of incidents reported by CCTV control room
staff per incident in the surveilled area known to the police. Obvious
attention to the efficiency of the process allied to a clear ethical
stance stressed in training and enforced in practice is the clear an-
swer to the emergent criticism.
Scheme Ownership
The next point concerns ownership of schemes. In essence, this is
the problem of the free-rider — the individual who stands aside from
contribution to an innovation that directly benefits him or her. The
process is familiar in all crime contexts: the retailer or publican who
does not contribute to ring-round schemes; the householder who
does not join Neighbourhood Watch; the credit card company that
does not join the Association of Payment Clearing Services.
The free-rider effect can operate at two levels in the CCTV context.
First, shops in a mall that do not contribute to CCTV costs will bene-
fit from CCTV equally with shops that do, through extra shoppers
and fewer crime losses. Second, ostensibly collaborating organisa-
tions involved may become rivals rather than partners. The third
author was first astonished by this latter process in the competition
for drug investigations and arrests between police and Her Majesty's
Customs, experienced in France, Belgium and the U.K. in remarkably
similar forms. Similarly, there are all the ingredients for competition
and rivalry between the police and the local authority in the Burnley
context. Indeed, despite all the rhetoric about partnership and multi-
agency cooperation that has been central to the current and previous
administration's policies over the last decade, the reality has almost
universally been tension and conflict between supposed partners
(see, for example, Crawford 1997). First-time occurrences in Burnley
would certainly include the acknowledgement of emerging tensions
and the need to confront them to head off the breakdown of relation-
ships that is common even in successful initiatives.
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In our view, the same approach is important in addressing prob-
lems of both types. It has three elements.
(1) The attempt to improve the system is the only process in
which all stakeholders have a common interest. It is sug-
gested that there is periodic collaborative effort to advance
the understanding of how CCTV works, shared with all in-
volved. This sounds woolly, but it is necessary to stress the
shared agenda positively, or the divisive factors will take over.
For example, a summary of detections achieved through
CCTV and how they happened would be informative. A study
of retailer-CCTV-police interactions during incidents would be
another. A study of store and street maintenance costs could
easily be mounted by the stores. A study of indices of usage of
the area by the Council by time of day may even help induce
stores to increase opening hours.
(2) Shopkeepers, both those who do contribute and those who do
not, should be explicitly and collectively consulted about the
conflicts and tensions experienced by CCTV control staff that
are inevitable in such an arrangement. This consultation
would address issues like: whether cameras should point at
contributing shops more than noncontributing shops, or just
track developing incidents; who has responsibility for notify-
ing the police for intrastore events; and whether control room
notification should occur in the same way for both kinds of
store.
(3) The police and the local authority should renegotiate their di-
vision of responsibilities now that practical experience of the
scheme has been accrued. Elsewhere, there have been signs
that unforseen turf wars jeopardise partnership for no better
reason than an agreement made in ignorance was not recon-
sidered. Topics for such negotiation should include police
powers to direct camera operation in emergencies, and, more
generally, ownership and maintenance of tapes/disks, proce-
dures for review and use as evidence of tapes; and even sim-
ple matters like rights of access to the control room and the
police station.
A final point in which Burnley may wish to take a leadership role
is the availability and use of CCTV evidence in sentencing decisions.
CCTV data are currently used in inducing guilty pleas and the like.
Other work carried out by the third author and his colleagues Sgt.
Chris Henshaw and Sylvia Chenery shows that magistrates are keen
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to see available video evidence, and that the effect of such evidence is
to increase the severity of sentences imposed. This evidence would
both increase the efficacy of the process whereby offenders acknowl-
edge their guilt and would make sentencing more commensurate with
the act committed. Knowledge that such use of CCTV evidence was
being promulgated in Burnley courts would almost certainly reinforce
the publicity-driven effects of CCTV schemes.
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